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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 15, 2019, a shooter opened fire on two mosques in Christchurch, 
New Zealand.1 As explained in his manifesto, the shooter specifically intended to 
 
*  J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2020; B.A. Political Science, Loyola 
University New Orleans, 2018. Thank you to Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy 
Professor of Law, for the inspiration, support, and guidance that was necessary for me to complete this comment. 
Further thanks to Professor Michael Vitello, Distinguished Professor of Law, for supplemental support on the 
criminal law issues that are raised in this Comment. And as always, thank you to my Village, that has been there 
for me through every academic and personal endeavor that I have undertaken in my life. 
1.  Christchurch Attack: Brenton Tarrant Pleads Not Guilty to All Charges, BBC (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
48631488?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c966094wvmqt/christchurch-mosque-
shootings&link_location=live-reporting-story (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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target the Muslim community.2 The gunman now faces fifty-one counts of murder 
and forty counts of attempted murder for the carnage he caused.3 
His campaign of terror did not stop inside the mosques.4 Footage of the attack 
instantaneously radiated far beyond Christchurch due to the shooter’s 
contemporaneous livestreaming of the attack to Facebook from a camera mounted 
on his head.5 Reproduction and dissemination of the horrifying video continued on 
the Internet, even after the livestream ended.6 
The attack in New Zealand and the associated livestream are not isolated 
instances.7 On October 9, 2019, a gunman attacking a synagogue in Germany 
streamed a similar video of his attack online.8 Within thirty minutes of posting the 
video, approximately 2,200 people streamed the footage before the website host 
removed it.9 Initial investigations found that viewers of the German video sent 
messages encouraging others to watch the video and share it.10 The footage online 
from Christchurch and Germany continued on with a life of its own, long after the 
terror attacks subsided.11 
Following violent attacks, victims and their families face exposure to and may 
relive these horrific events through traumatizing online footage.12 Not only do 
 
2.  Max Walden, New Zealand Mosque Attacks: Who Is Brenton Tarrant?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/zealand-mosque-attacks-brenton-tarrant-190316093149803.html (on 
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
3.  Christchurch Attack: Brenton Tarrant Pleads Not Guilty to All Charges, supra note 1. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id.; New Zealander Jailed for Sharing Christchurch Mass Shooting Video, AL JAZEERA (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/zealander-jailed-sharing-christchurch-mass-shooting-video-
190618063252482.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter New Zealander 
Jailed]. 
7.  See Germany Shooting: 2,200 People Watched on Twitch, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49998284 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(describing a similar situation in Germany where an attacker at a synagogue live-streamed his attack to online 
website Twitch). 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  See, e.g., Video Showing Deadly Shooting Near Synagogue on Yom Kippur was Livestreamed, CBS 
NEWS (Oct. 9, 2019, 7:51 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/germany-synagogue-shooting-halle-grenade-
reportedly-thrown-jewish-cemetery-today-2019-10-09/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(illustrating the widespread sharing of the video of an attack against a German mosque and that “the video was 
viewed by about 2200 people in the halfhour before it was flagged and removed . . . and [d]ownloaded versions, 
however, were circulated in far-right online groups”); Olivia Solon, Six Months after Christchurch Shootings, 
Videos of Attack Are Still on Facebook, NBC (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/six-
months-after-christchurch-shootings-videos-attack-are-still-facebook-n1056691 (on file with the University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that the video from the Christchurch livestream was still on Facebook six 
months after the attack happened). 
12.  Amy Wiggins, Christchurch Mosque Shooting: Livestream Viewing Traumatic for Many, NZ HERALD 
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12214696 (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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victims and their families face an emotional—and potentially physical—uphill 
battle of trying to comprehend and heal from their firsthand accounts, but they 
must also live in a world where what is likely to be the darkest day of their lives 
has found a new life online.13 The footage from the terror livestreams often depicts 
wounded or dead bodies and other reminders of the carnage.14 
In New Zealand, one of the sharers of the footage faces a jail sentence of 
twenty-one months under a New Zealand law prohibiting the distribution of 
objectionable content.15 Globally, other countries have laws that similarly punish 
the glorification of terror.16 However, it is unlikely that regulation of violent 
footage in the United States, under similar legislation, is possible due to the strong 
speech protections the United States Constitution provides.17 
First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States protects speech that is 
unpopular and upsetting.18 Rationalization of the strength of the First Amendment, 
in part, is founded on the idea that freedom of speech concerning public issues lies 
at the heart of self-governance.19 First Amendment protections make regulation of 
speech impossible unless such regulation can pass heightened scrutiny or satisfy 
one of the “categories” the Supreme Court determined to be unworthy of 
protection.20 
A distinction between speaking and expressing exists from a theoretical 
 
13.  See Katy McLaughlin & Jeena A. Kar, Aftermath of the Parkland Shooting: A Case Report of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder in an Adolescent Survivor, CUREUS (Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://assets.cureus.com/uploads/case_report/pdf/24706/1576171026-20191212-29551-rq4x53.pdf (on file with 
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the impact of post-traumatic stress disorder in a student 
who survived a mass shooting at her school); Wiggins, supra note 12 (describing the potential psychological 
impacts that may result after viewing violent footage); see also Graham Macklin, The Christchurch Attacks: 
Livestream Terror in the Viral Video Age, CTC SENTINEL, July 2019, at 18 
https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2019/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062019.pdf (on file with the University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (describing the threat of terrorism in New Zealand to be “a ‘latent’ threat rather than a ‘lived 
reality,’ [where the country] suffered the single largest loss of life to terrorism in its history”). 
14.  Wiggins, supra note 12. 
15.  Charlotte Graham-McLay, New Zealand Man Gets 21 Months for Sharing Video of Christchurch 
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/asia/new-zealand-video.html 
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
16.  See infra Part III (detailing some of the approaches taken by other countries); see also Australia Blocks 
Access to Eight Websites Showing Video of New Zealand Mosque Attacks, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-shooting-australia/australia-blocks-access-to-eight-websites-
showing-video-of-new-zealand-mosque-attacks-idUSKCN1VU034 (on file with the University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (describing new legislation in Australia that permits penalization of social media companies for 
failing to expeditiously remove violent content from their platforms). 
17.  See infra Part IV (summarizing the various complexities of the First Amendment and the strength of 
the right to freedom of speech). 
18.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that the remedy 
to bad speech is “more speech” and Americans should challenge laws that abridge free speech). 
19.  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). 
20.  See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1003, 1030 
(2013) (describing that First Amendment litigation requires “‘heightened scrutiny,’ which requires that the 
restriction be justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly drawn to serve that interest”); see also 
id. at 1009–10 (describing that the Court has not found freedom of expression to be protected in instances where 
there are “(1) unlawful verbal acts, (2) obscenity, (3) child pornography, and (4) government speech”). 
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standpoint.21 Within this dichotomy, speech is a “contemplation of engaging in 
some action” and expression amounts to actual engagement in that action.22 Under 
this structure, the contemplation stage receives First Amendment protections, 
whereas the conduct does not.23 The law considers conduct as fundamentally 
different than speech and does not automatically provide the same protections it 
does to speech.24 
In the context of sharing footage of mass shootings, the “sharer” of footage 
online intends to aid the shooter’s violent tirade.25 The sharer’s actions are 
analogous to aiding the actions of the shooter, likely breaching the line of speech 
and becoming conduct.26 In actively reproducing the footage online, the sharer’s 
conduct extends beyond typical First Amendment protection.27 Instead, this 
conduct amounts to an affirmative intent to help the shooter carry out his act of 
terror and justifies the extension of accomplice liability.28 This Comment argues 
that accomplice liability should extend to individuals who disseminate violent 
footage a principal attacker initially publishes because the sharer is helping the 
principal attacker complete their crime and not simply engaging in protected 
speech.29 
Part II describes the Christchurch attack and the actions of the sharers that led 
to criminal charges.30 Part III examines international approaches to the regulation 
of speech that depict violence and terror.31 Part IV presents the limitations set by 
First Amendment jurisprudence.32 Part V provides a brief introduction to the theory 
of accomplice liability in the United States.33 Part VI argues that a theory of aiding 
and abetting is a preferable way to hold online sharers accountable for their 
actions.34 
 
21.  Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427, 439 (2015). 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See infra Section VI.A (discussing what sharers are doing to promote the offense of terror). 
26.  See Schauer, supra note 21, at 439 (describing the distinction between thinking about conduct and 
actually engaging in the conduct). 
27.  See infra Part VI (illustrating the difference between freedom of speech and where the threshold for 
accomplice liability may lie for those who disseminate footage online). 
28.  See United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing the requirements to find 
an accomplice liable for aiding the principal actor); see also United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749, 753 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (“[a] conviction [for aiding and abetting] ‘merely requires that [defendants’] association and 
participation with the venture were in a way calculated to bring about that venture’s success.’”) (quoting United 
States v. Salazar, 958 F.2d 1285, 1292 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
29.  See infra Part IV (describing the current strength and narrow ability for the government to regulated 
speech in the United States). 
30.  Infra Part II. 
31.  Infra Part III. 
32.  Infra Part IV. 
33.  Infra Part V. 
34.  Infra Part VI. 
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II. THE NEW ZEALAND ATTACK 
New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, declared the March 15, 2019 
events in Christchurch to be “one of New Zealand’s darkest days.”35 Exemplifying 
Prime Minister Ardern’s declaration are narrative accounts from the survivors of 
the attack.36 One survivor of the attack attributed his survival to hiding under the 
bodies of those already killed.37 Other victims witnessed the shooting of a father 
and his daughter while sustaining bullet wounds themselves.38 Undoubtedly, the 
events of March 15, 2019, will remain in the minds of New Zealanders 
indefinitely.39 Section A provides an overview of the moments leading up to and 
during the Christchurch shooting.40 Section B summarizes the responses taken 
online after the livestream ended.41 
A. The Attack 
Shortly before the carnage on the Muslim community in Christchurch began, 
a twenty-eight-year-old Australian man posted on the Internet.42 Brenton Tarrant’s 
8chan post declared that he believed it was time to carry out an attack.43 Tarrant’s 
choice to post to 8chan was likely not a random choice.44 8chan is an online forum 
tied to racially fueled mass violence.45 In 2019 alone, three mass shootings 
occurred after posts filled with hate poured onto 8chan.46 
On Tarrant’s 8chan posting, he provided a link to his manifesto and directions 
 
35.  Jacinda Ardern on the Christchurch Shooting: ‘One of New Zealand’s Darkest Days,’ THE GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/15/one-of-new-zealands-darkest-days-jacinda-
ardern-responds-to-christchurch-shooting (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
36.  Id.; see Sean Flynn, The Harrowing Hours and Defiant Aftermath of the New Zealand Mosque 
Shootings, GQ (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/new-zealand-mosque-shooting-christchurch (on file 
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing a narrative of the events of the attack and the aftermath 
in the days following). 
37.  Mohamad Abdalla, Finding Dignity and Grace in the Aftermath of the Christchurch Attack, THE 
CONVERSATION (Mar. 22, 2019), https://theconversation.com/finding-dignity-and-grace-in-the-aftermath-of-the-
christchurch-attack-114072 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
38.  Id. 
39.  See Jacinda Ardern on the Christchurch Shooting: ‘One of New Zealand’s Darkest Days,’ supra note 
35 (providing the Prime Minister’s response and description of the Christchurch attack). 
40.  Infra Section II.A. 
41.  Infra Section II.B. 
42.  Walden, supra note 2. 
43.  Macklin, supra note 13, at 18. 
44.  See Drew Harwell, Three Mass Shootings This Year Began with a Hateful Screed on 8chan. Its Founder 
Calls It a Terrorist Refuge in Plain Sight., WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2019, 6:51 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/04/three-mass-shootings-this-year-began-with-hateful-
screed-chan-its-founder-calls-it-terrorist-refuge-plain-sight/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (describing 8chan’s prevalence with online extremists). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
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to access his livestream.47 Tarrant’s post directed readers to “please do your part 
spreading my message,” especially in the event he did not survive his attack.48 
Tarrant’s seventy-four-page manifesto he linked to the livestream included strong 
sentiment of neo-fascist ideology and anti-immigration rhetoric.49 
Shortly after posting, Tarrant began his livestream and entered the first mosque 
with a semi-automatic rifle where he subsequently opened fire.50 Upon concluding 
his attack at the first mosque, Tarrant then drove three miles to a second mosque 
and continued his massacre.51 During the shooting, Tarrant’s livestream on 
Facebook attracted an online audience.52 Some watched in horror and others in 
support.53 One columnist described the attack and livestream “as almost an internet 
performance.”54 
The performative nature of Tarrant’s attack posed difficult questions for 
journalists.55 Following the shooting, the international editor for the New York 
Times described the actions of Tarrant as “using all of the power of social media 
and the internet to spread his vile views.”56 In weighing how to cover the attack, 
the editor described the need of the media to “avoid becoming the tools of a 
terrorist” in light of Tarrant’s apparent coordination of online publications before, 
during, and after the shooting.57 The media had to weigh coverage of a news event 
worthy of global coverage against providing the shooter the platform and attention 
he desired.58 
 
47.  Macklin, supra note 13, at 18; cf. id. (noting that Tarrant also sent a link to a generic email of the Prime 
Minister indicating that he was preparing to carry out his attack). 
48.  Cf. id. at 19 (providing an argument that Tarrant’s goal was not to kill people of the Muslim faith, but 
rather to make a video of someone killing Muslims). 
49.  Walden, supra note 2. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Macklin, supra note 13, at 20. 
53.  See Christchurch Man Jailed for Sharing Video Footage of Massacre, THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/18/christchurch-man-jailed-for-sharing-video-footage-of-
massacre (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that Arps described the live-stream 
video as “awesome”); Macklin, supra note 13, at 20 (noting that Facebook users watching the attack did not report 
it to Facebook for twenty-nine minutes). 
54.  Hanna Ingber, The New Zealand Attack Posed New Challenges for Journalists. Here Are the Decisions 
the Times Made, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/reader-center/new-zealand-
media-coverage.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Macklin, supra note 13, at 20 
(theorizing that “Tarrant grasped intuitively that digital technology could and would amplify his murderous 
message, ensuring its projection far beyond the cloistered confines of the 8chan sub-thread on which it 
originated”). 
55.  Ingber, supra note 54. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id.; see Frank Shyong, Column: Mass Shooters Seek Notoriety, and We, the Media, Provide It. Is There 
Another Way?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-11/mass-
shooters-seek-notoriety-in-media (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the role of 
the media in mass shootings and how it motivates the shooters to commit the act and the coverage inspires others 
to carry out similar attacks). 
58.  Ingber, supra note 54; see Shyong, supra note 57 (describing the considerations that journalists need 
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B. Internet Conduct in Relation to the Christchurch Shooting 
Within a day of the shooting, Facebook removed approximately 1.5 million 
videos of the Christchurch attack.59 Of the 1.5 million videos, Facebook blocked 
1.2 million videos using automated technology.60 Elsewhere online, users 
“repackaged and re-cut” the video to “outsmart the platform’s detection system” 
and put the video on other websites.61 Comments users posted to online message 
boards discussed saving the video to make it available for republication in the event 
of removal from internet sites.62 Estimates project that more than 800 “visually 
distinct” uploaded videos circled the Internet.63 
One New Zealander now faces charges for his role in disseminating the video 
online.64 After the attack, self-proclaimed white supremacist Philip Arps shared 
the footage.65 Arps went out of his way to doctor the footage to include crosshairs 
and a kill count.66 The footage he manipulated made it look as if the video was 
from the perspective of a first-person shooter game.67 
Arps’ purported goal of editing the livestream was to “lighten up the video and 
make it a bit funny by making it into a meme that would then be shared on social 
media.”68 Arps faces two counts of distribution of objectionable publications under 
New Zealand’s “Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act” 
(“Classification Act”).69 Under the Classification Act, material is objectional when 
it includes publications that promote “acts of torture or the infliction of extreme 
violence or extreme cruelty” among other depictions.70 The maximum penalty 
 
to make when deciding how to cover mass shooting events). 
59.  Macklin, supra note 13, at 20. 
60.  Id.; see Issie Lapowsky, Why Tech Didn’t Stop the New Zealand Attack from Going Viral, WIRED (Mar. 
15, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/new-zealand-shooting-video-social-media/ (on file with the University 
of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how Facebook has been implementing and developing automated tools to 
remove uploaded content that violates their policies). 
61.  Macklin, supra note 13, at 18. 
62.  Ingber, supra note 54. 
63.  Macklin, supra note 13, at 20. 
64.  New Zealander Jailed, supra note 6. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Graham-McLay, supra note 15. 
68.  Jordan Oppert, Man Sent to Prison for 21 Months for Distributing Footage of Christchurch Terrorist 
Attack Appealing His Sentence, 1 NEWS (June 17, 2019), https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/man-
sent-prison-21-months-distributing-footage-christchurch-terrorist-attack-appealing-his-sentence (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
69.  David Clarkson & Anne Clarkson, Philip Arps Charged with Sharing Live Stream of Christchurch 
Mosque Massacre, STUFF (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-
shooting/111425937/man-charged-with-sharing-live-stream-of-christchurch-mosque-massacre (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review); White Supremacist Philip Arps Has Second Appeal for Sharing Mosque 
Shooting Video, STUFF (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/117493354/white-supremacist-
philip-arps-has-second-appeal-for-sharing-mosque-shooting-video [hereinafter White Supremacist Philip Arps] 
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
70.  See Censorship and the Internet, DEP’T INTERNAL AFF., https://www.dia.govt.nz/Censorship-and-the-
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under the Classification Act is imprisonment for fourteen years.71 Arps’ sentence 
for his acts amounted to twenty-one months, including a range of post-release 
conditions such as no internet access.72 
III. GLORIFICATION LAWS: NEW ZEALAND AND BEYOND 
Internationally, governments have set guidelines and created laws that regulate 
speech—specifically speech promoting or spreading messages by terrorists.73 
Section A details New Zealand’s Office of Censorship, particularly its response to 
the Christchurch shooting.74 Section B discusses the United Kingdom’s 2006 
Terrorism Act and other specific laws against the glorification of terror.75 Section 
C explores a new law Australia passed after the Christchurch shooting that 
regulates the behavior of online platforms by holding the executives in charge of 
such sites liable.76 
A. New Zealand 
Since 1892, various forms of censorship legislation monitor the conduct of 
publications within New Zealand.77 Currently, New Zealand has an office 
responsible for censoring online content.78 In 1993, the Classification Act in New 
Zealand established the Office of Film and Literature Classification (“OFLC”).79 
Today, the OFLC remains the office New Zealand charged with censoring and 
classifying content.80 The OFLC’s purported purpose “is to prevent harm to the 
 
Internet (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing other types 
of objectionable material to include “exploitation of children or young persons for sexual purposes; use of 
violence or coercion to compel any person to participate in sexual conduct; sexual conduct upon the body of a 
dead person; use or urine or excrement in association with degrading or dehumanizing or sexual conduct . . . [and] 
bestiality”). 
71.  Clarkson & Clarkson, supra note 69. 
72.  Oppert, supra note 68 (providing all of Arps’ post-release conditions including “psychiatric 
assessments, no internet access and drug and alcohol treatment”). 
73.  See infra Sections III.A–C (discussing the laws and regulation by New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia). 
74.  Infra Section III.A. 
75.  Infra Section III.B. 
76.  Infra Section III.C. 
77.  See History of Censorship in New Zealand, OFF. FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION, 
https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/about-nz-classification/history-of-censorship-in-new-zealand/ (last 
visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter History of Censorship] 
(describing the history of classification laws in New Zealand from 1892 to present). 
78.  New Zealand’s Classification Law: The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act, 1993, OFF. 
OF FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION, https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/about-nz-classification/new-
zealands-classification-law/ (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) 
[hereinafter New Zealand’s Classification Law]. 
79.  Id. 
80.  History of Censorship, supra note 77. 
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New Zealand public by restricting the availability of publications containing 
harmful material.”81 
Following the Christchurch attack, the OFLC released its decision on the 
classification of the livestream.82 The OFLC found that the livestream was 
objectionable and promoted “the infliction of extreme violence and cruelty.”83 In 
justifying the classification decision, the OFLC found that “the right to freedom of 
expression . . . is subject ‘only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’”84 After the OFLC 
released its classification decision, journalists had to determine how to cover the 
event while also complying with the OFLC’s classification decision.85 The 
OFLC’s website attempted to provide guidance to the public on what to do with 
the livestream footage.86 Despite the OFLC’s guidelines which provided little 
direction to journalists, international news organizations began to make their own 
determinations on what they could publish.87 
Falling in line with the OFLC decision and the Classification Act, major news 
outlets signed a pact to limit the coverage of Tarrant’s attack.88 In this 
unprecedented action, these outlets cited the desire to limit coverage “that actively 
champion[s] white supremacist or terrorist ideology.”89 Concerned about public 
reaction and the ability of general audiences to process and understand coverage, 
the news outlets and the OFLC’s Chief Censor further justified restrictions on 
publications as potentially “instructional” for future attacks.90 
B. United Kingdom 
Building on previous contemporary terrorism laws, the United Kingdom 
enacted the Terrorism Act 2006, following the 2005 terrorist bombings in 
London.91 The Terrorism Act 2006 created a new offense that prohibits the 
 
81.  New Zealand’s Classification Law, supra note 78. 
82.  OFFICE OF FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION, OFLC REF. NO. 1900148.000, NOTICE OF DECISION 
UNDER SECTION 38(1): CHRISTCHURCH MOSQUE ATTACK LIVESTREAM 1 (2019), 
https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/assets/PDFs/Christchurch-Attack-Livestream-Classification-
Decision.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
83.  Id. at 4. 
84.  Id. at 8. 
85.  See Ingber, supra note 54 (discussing how the “unusual nature of the attack change[d] The Times’s 
calculations around how to cover it”). 
86.  OFLC Responds to Christchurch – What You Can Do, OFF. FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION, 
https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/news/latest-news/oflc-response-to-christchurch-what-you-can-do/ (last 
visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
87.  Ingber, supra note 54; Jack Shafer, Why New Zealand’s Press Just Put on Blinders for Its Biggest 
Story, POLITICO (May 1, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/05/01/self-censorship-media-
new-zealand-white-supremacist-2019-226766 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
88.  Shafer, supra note 87. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Clive Walker, Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1137, 
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encouragement of terrorism.92 
The encouragement offense “applies to a statement that is likely to be 
understood as a direct or indirect encouragement . . . of acts of terrorism.”93 The 
offense requires the actor, at the time of publication of a statement, to either intend 
to induce terror or be reckless in “directly or indirectly encourag[ing] . . . [members 
of the public] to commit, prepare or instigate” terror.94 Statements glorifying terror 
or appearing to glorify terror are punishable under the encouragement offense.95 
Individuals found guilty of this charge face up to fifteen years in prison.96 
In discussions leading up to a vote on the law, concerns existed that the law 
would be overly broad in its criminalization of speech.97 For example, opponents 
raised concerns regarding the criminalization of speech “glorif[ying] the armed 
opposition to the Apartheid regime in South Africa” or speech against Israel in 
favor of Palestinians regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.98 Despite such 
concerns, the law ultimately passed and remains in effect as a part of the United 
Kingdom’s terror legislation.99 
C. Australia 
In the wake of the Christchurch aftermath, Australian lawmakers began taking 
swift actions to stop the publication of the livestream footage on social media 
sites.100 Armed with the threat of fines and jail time, the goal of Australia’s new 
law is to hold the online website hosts liable for violent content posted online.101 
The amendment to the Australian Criminal Code titled “Sharing of Abhorrent 
Violent Material” works to “ensure that online platforms cannot be exploited and 
weaponised by perpetrators of violence.”102 The new law defines “abhorrent 
violent conduct” to include acts of terror, murder, attempted murder, torture, rape, 
 
1137, 1141 (2006). 
92.  Id. 
93.  Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 1 (UK). 
94.  Id. at § 1(2)(b). 
95.  Id. at § 1(3). 
96.  Id. at § 1(7). 
97.  Walker, supra note 91, at 1141; see New Terror Law Comes into Force, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_politics/4905304.stm (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(describing concerns over glorification provision of the law being too broad). 
98.  Walker, supra note 91, at 1141–42; see New Terror Law Comes into Force, supra note 97 (quoting a 
member of a human rights group discussing problems with the law that “[a]nyone supporting violence to remove 
a regime anywhere in the world now or in the past would theoretically get caught up”). 
99.  Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 1. 
100.  Damien Cave, Host Violent Content? In Australia, You Could Go to Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/world/australia/internet-extremist-violence-christchurch.html (on file with 
the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
101.  Id. 
102.  Explanatory Memorandum, Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Bill 
2019 (Cth) 3 (Austl.). 
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and kidnapping.103 The law is applicable regardless of whether the conduct 
occurred in Australia or elsewhere.104 It targets “internet service providers,” 
providers of a “content service,” or providers of a “hosting service.”105 
Failure on the part of website hosts to remove and prevent the spread of 
material can lead to imprisonment of company executives’ for up to three years 
and fines up to 10% of the platform’s annual revenue.106 Australian lawmakers 
believed the inaction of social media companies in the wake of the Christchurch 
aftermath—citing Facebook in particular—failed to protect users from exposure to 
dangerous online content.107 
The Australian law appears to go further than any other countries’, holding 
major websites accountable for failing to remove content others post online.108 
Representatives of social media companies, including Facebook, feel the 
government failed to consult relevant players in the digital industry before passing 
this law.109 Skepticism shrouds the law, questioning how enforcement would work 
and whether Australia will be able to hold executives accountable.110 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Americans consider freedom of speech one of the most important rights the 
United States Constitution provides.111 Speech in the United States functions 
within the paradigm that speech operates in a marketplace of ideas.112 One scholar 
succinctly describes this freedom as “what it means to be a person . . . [i]t is what 
it means to be a member of a functioning democracy . . . [a]nd it is what it means 
to be an American.”113 
While freedom of speech is one of the strongest protections the Bill of Rights 
 
103.  Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 (Cth) sch 1 s 474.32(1) 
(Austl.). 
104.  Id. at § 474.33(1). 
105.  Id. at § 474.33(1)(a). 
106.  James Griffiths, Australia Passes Law to Stop Spread of Violent Content Online After Christchurch 
Massacre, CNN (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/04/australia/australia-violent-video-social-media-
law-intl/index.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
107.  Id. 
108.  Cave, supra note 100. 
109.  Griffiths, supra note 106. 
110.  See Evelyn Douek, Australia’s New Social Media Law Is a Mess, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2019, 8:28 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/australias-new-social-media-law-mess (on file with the University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (listing the concerns and questions about the Australian law including a question regarding 
the effectiveness of the law). 
111.  See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (describing freedom of expression as “the matrix, 
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom”). 
112.  See Sedler, supra note 20, at 1017 (theorizing “the primary function of the First Amendment is to 
ensure that all ideas enter the marketplace of ideas and compete with one another, seeking to win acceptance by 
the public as a whole”). 
113.  Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 380–82 
(2004). 
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affords, there are restrictions on this right.114 The following sections detail three of 
the primary ways the Supreme Court limits the freedom of speech.115 Section A 
discusses the prohibition on content-based regulations of speech.116 Section B 
presents the threshold that the Court has set for speech to qualify as inciting 
violence.117 Section C examines the Court’s jurisprudence and limitations on hate 
speech.118 
A. Content-Based Regulations 
Content-based regulation of speech occurs when the government abridges 
speech based solely on the content of the speech.119 The Supreme Court held in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., Minnesota that content-based regulations of speech are 
“presumptively invalid.”120 When a government, including state and local 
governments, enact content-based regulations, the regulations must survive strict 
scrutiny.121 To survive strict scrutiny in this context, the government regulation 
must: “(1) advance compelling or overriding government ends; (2) be directly and 
substantially related to advancing those ends; and (3) be the least restrictive, 
effective means to advance the ends.”122 
The Court declined to extend First Amendment protections to some types of 
speech and expressive conduct.123 The limited areas of communication the First 
Amendment does not protect include obscene speech, speech that is likely to incite 
violence, and speech constituting fighting words.124 
Additionally, the Court has held that to create a category of unprotected 
 
114.  See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) (noting “[e]ven 
protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times”). 
115.  Infra Sections IV.A–C. 
116.  Infra Section IV.A. 
117.  Infra Section IV.B. 
118.  Infra Section IV.C. 
119.  Sedler, supra note 20, at 1021. 
120.  505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral 
and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 596 (2003) (describing the rigid scrutiny 
that the government must overcome when trying to pass a content-based law as “almost always fatal”). 
121.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)) (finding “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny 
regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas 
contained’ in the regulated speech”). 
122.  R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate 
Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 294 (2016); see generally id. at 293 (discussing 
the different types of scrutiny applicable to different government actions within the context of free speech and 
the First Amendment including intermediate scrutiny and reasonableness balancing). 
123.  Sedler, supra note 20, at 1009–10. 
124.  See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (listing unprotected types of speech categories 
to include incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child 
pornography, fraud, and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat that the government has the power 
to prevent”). 
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speech, a legislature cannot easily change the longstanding judgment of Americans 
by deciding to not protect speech that has been traditionally deemed as acceptable 
by society.125 The Court rejected a simple balancing test that “weigh[s] the value 
of a particular category of speech against its social costs and then punishes that 
category of speech if it fails the test.”126 A justification based only on this balancing 
test is unlikely to outweigh the benefit that free speech provides to society.127 
Absent evidence that a type of speech has a long-standing tradition of a lack of 
acceptance in society, banishment, or regulation, the creation of new categories of 
unprotected speech is not justified.128 
B. Incitement to Violence 
The standard set by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio provides the doctrine 
under which speech qualifies as incitement to violence.129 Under the Brandenburg 
standard, speech is inciteful when “such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”130 Furthermore, the speaker must intend for such lawless action to result 
from his or her communication.131 
Brandenburg stands for the proposition that advocacy of illegal activity 
through speech remains a protected form of speech.132 However, the law ceases to 
protect speech when it reaches the point of inciting others to commit the same 
act.133 Under Brandenburg, advocating for lawless action alone is insufficient to 
render such speech incitement.134 Rather, evidence must exist that the speaker 
“intended to produce imminent lawless action.”135 So the requirements of 
Brandenburg make it difficult for courts to successfully classify speech as inciteful 
because it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to show specific intent in these 
situations.136 
 
125.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011). 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. 
129.  395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
130.  Id. 
131.  Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (describing the incitement framework and the requirement 
that the “words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder” finding the state’s claim that 
the speech had a “tendency to lead to violence” insufficient). 
132.  James Hart, Revisiting Incitement Speech, 38 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 111, 111 (2019). 
133.  See id. (arguing that the distinction between inciting and advocating should be abandoned). 
134.  See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (overturning the statute at issue because it “purports to punish mere 
advocacy”); Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in a Digital Era, 80 MISS. L.J. 1263, 1265 (2011) 
(quoting Brandenburg) (describing the rejection of the criminalization of “subversive advocacy” by the Court in 
Brandenburg). 
135.  Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
136.  See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm 
Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1169 (describing meeting the 
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The underlying theory in Brandenburg is that speech can be persuasive enough 
to convince another party to act.137 But to qualify speech as inciteful and impose 
liability, the speech must be persuasive enough that a listener will hear it and then 
quickly engage in the described lawless action.138 If the speech itself is not 
persuasive, the listener is less likely to follow the speech’s directions.139 This has 
proven to be a difficult threshold to match.140 
C. Hate Speech 
Hate speech exists when expressive content is demeaning “on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, gender, religion, age [or] disability.”141 The Court in Matal v. Tam 
described the problem of regulating hate speech within the context of First 
Amendment protections.142 In Matal, the Court held that the First Amendment 
primarily protects “the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”143 Hate 
speech remains protected unless it rises beyond abstract advocacy and moves into 
the realm of incitement.144 Even speech that society considers hateful has 
protection and is the “proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence.”145 
While hate speech receives First Amendment protections, hate crimes do 
not.146 On the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) website, the DOJ notes that the 
government cannot punish ideas and speech that are hateful.147 The DOJ 
emphasizes, however, that the protections of the First Amendment stop upon the 
 
imminence requirement under Brandenburg as narrow and “address[ing] speech activity designed to persuade 
someone to commit an unlawful act, not speech designed to facilitate the commission of an unlawful act by a 
person who has already decided to act”). 
137.  Clay Calvert, First Amendment Envelope Pushers: Revisiting the Incitement-to-Violence Test with 
Messrs. Brandenburg, Trump, & Spencer, 51 CONN. L. REV. 117, 134 (2019). 
138.  Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1175, 1201 (2000). 
139.  Calvert, supra note 137, at 134. 
140.  See Chris Montgomery, Note, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet and the Age of 
Terrorism?: The Secret Weakening of a Venerable Doctrine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141, 144 (2009) (arguing the 
Brandenburg doctrine “is in serious danger of sliding into obsolescence”). 
141.  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017). 
142.  137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
143.  Id. at 1764 (quoting Holmes, J., dissenting in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929)); 
see, e.g., id. at 1751 (describing the underlying speech in this case which was an “a dance-rock band’s application 
for federal trademark registration of the band’s name, ‘The Slants’” and Justice Alito’s description of the 
controversy of the term being the term “slants” as “a derogatory term for persons of Asian descent”). 
144.  See Vitiello, supra note 138, at 1177 (suggesting the societal costs that are a result of the strong First 
Amendment protection of hate speech). 
145.  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting Holmes, J., dissent, United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 
655 (1929)). 
146.  Learn About Hate Crimes, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/learn-about-hate-crimes 
(last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter Learn About Hate 
Crimes]. 
147.  Id. 
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commission of an actual crime.148 When hateful beliefs motivate a crime, the law 
does not protect those motivations, even if the underlying motive’s basis is in 
“philosophical beliefs.”149 The effects of these crimes drive the justification for 
having a set of laws that punish hate crimes.150 A different type of crime, for 
example, a simple assault, may only impact the individuals directly involved and 
those close around them.151 However, hate crimes may impact a broader 
community, with potential harm even expanding nationally.152 
V. AIDING AND ABETTING 
Aiding and abetting is a form of derivative liability where a principal actor 
violates the law, and a secondary actor—an accomplice—contributes to the 
principal’s acts.153 To find a secondary actor liable, the principal must violate the 
law, and the secondary actor must engage in an intentional act to help the 
principal.154 The intentional act justifies assigning blame to the secondary party.155 
The premise of extending liability to the accomplice from the acts of the principal 
is the idea “that the accomplice has a stake in the principal’s acts,” desiring for the 
underlying crime’s completion and aiding the principal to reach that goal.156 
Applying this theory to the New Zealand attack, the shooter would be the principal, 
and the sharer would be the accomplice.157 
Created by the American Law Institute, the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) 
“play[s] an important part in the widespread revision and codification of the 
substantive criminal law of the United States.”158 Serving as a baseline for this 
Comment, courts across the United States frequently look to the MPC for guidance 
 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Georgina Fuller, The Serious Impact and Consequences of Physical Assault, AUSTRALIAN INST. 
CRIMINOLOGY (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi496 (on file with the University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
152.  Learn About Hate Crimes, supra note 146. 
153.  Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. 
L. REV. 323, 337 (1985). 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. 
156.  See Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the 
Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (1998) (addressing the proper extent of a secondary actor’s 
criminal culpability). 
157.  See How Are People Charged as an Accomplice?, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/how-
are-people-charged-as-an-accomplice-35892 (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (describing the relationship between the accomplice and the principal as “the main perpetrator of a 
crime is referred to as a principal while the individuals assisting in the commission of the crime are referred to as 
accomplices”). 
158.  Model Penal Code, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/publications/show/model-penal-code/ (last visited 
June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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while making decisions.159 The MPC defines accomplice liability as having “the 
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.”160 An 
accomplice shows purpose by aiding or agreeing to aid the principal in such acts.161 
The purpose prong of accomplice liability under the MPC requires a higher level 
of culpability than in other jurisdictions.162 
Under common law, the threshold for accomplice liability was low.163 
Generally, an actor could face liability for aiding the principal so long as the 
“accomplice did ‘something’ to aid the crime.”164 There was no requirement that 
the accomplice’s liability match the liability of the principal actor.165 
The MPC recognizes four degrees of culpability.166 Depending on the offense 
and the required degree of culpability, the MPC requires that the actor had the 
requisite culpability concerning a material element of the offense.167 The highest 
degree of culpability is when an actor acts purposely with the “conscious 
object[ive] to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result” with 
“respect to an element of the offense.”168 To find an accomplice liable, the MPC 
typically requires a finding that the accomplice acted with purpose.169 
Alternatively, MPC § 2.06(4) provides that accomplice liability extends where 
“causing a particular result is an element of an offense.”170 For example, to find 
actors guilty of criminal homicide, their conduct must have led to a human’s 
death.171 
Some states have specific laws that lower the level of mental culpability 
required for accomplice liability in the context of certain crimes.172 For example, 
New York’s general accomplice liability statute requires the accomplice to have 
 
159.  Id. 
160.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
161.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii). 
162.  Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (describing a purpose requirement), with WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9A.08.020 (2019) (listing a knowledge requirement for liability for the conduct of another). 
163.  Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 72–73 (2014). 
164.  Id. (emphasis in original) (citing R. DESTY, A COMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW § 37A, at 
106 (1882)). 
165.  Kadish, supra note 153, at 339. 
166.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
167.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1). 
168.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1)–(2)(a)(i). 
169.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stating that a 
person is an accomplice if he or she acts “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
offense”). 
170.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4); see Sherif Girgis, Comment, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability: 
Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 460, 467 (2013) (describing the requirement of intending a lethal result for 
an accomplice actor to be liable for first degree murder). 
171.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requiring 
fatality of a human for criminal homicide to occur). 
172.  See Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1366, 1409–10 
(2016) (describing areas of the law where complicity for certain crimes, like dog fighting, drops to a knowing 
requirement where the general accomplice liability statute requires purpose). 
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the same degree of mental culpability as the principal actor.173 However, New York 
has a specific law addressing prostitution and a specific provision for accomplice 
liability within the context of prostitution.174 When an individual works to advance 
prostitution, the degree of required mental culpability the law requires is only 
“knowingly.”175 New York’s laws serve as a helpful illustration to show how states 
can pair a specific mens rea requirement to a specific crime while maintaining a 
general accomplice liability statute.176 
Accomplice liability also requires that the secondary actor act with intent.177 
When the secondary actor provides aid or encouragement to the principal actor to 
help in the furtherance of a crime, the secondary actor is acting and meets the intent 
requirement.178 Common examples of courts extending accomplice liability are 
when the accomplice acts as a “look-out, or drive[s] the getaway car, or hold[s] a 
ladder” to help the primary actor in the execution of the crime.179 
Those opposing imposition of accomplice liability cite the derivative nature of 
the doctrine.180 For liability to extend to an accomplice, culpability begins with a 
primary actor, and the accomplice’s assistance or contribution to the primary 
actor’s conduct creates the extension.181 Because the accomplice is liable as a result 
of the principal’s actions, an argument exists that an element of the overriding 
criminal law principles is lacking: a requirement of personal wrongdoing.182 
Although the liability is derivative, the law does not impose liability without the 
secondary actor also acting.183 Thus, even though the principal and the accomplice 
have a relationship, accomplice liability is not a form of vicarious liability.184 
  
 
173.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 2019). 
174.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.15 (McKinney 2019). 
175.  Id. 
176.  See PENAL § 20.00 (providing New York’s accomplice liability statute). 
177.  Kadish, supra note 153, at 346. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. at 345. 
180.  Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of Accomplice Liability, 87 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 129 (2013). 
181.  Kadish, supra note 153, at 337. 
182.  Heyman, supra note 180, at 129. 
183.  Kadish, supra note 153, at 345. 
184.  See id. (debunking an argument that accomplice liability is a form of vicarious liability); see also 
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 4:1 (Monique C. M. Leahy ed., 2020) (defining the 
underpinnings of vicarious liability as a “form of social policy adjustment under which, even though a person to 
whom wrongdoing of another is imputed is him or herself personally without fault, legal public policy renders 
that person nevertheless liable (a form of strict liability)”). 
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VI. AIDING AND ABETTING BY SHARING 
Attackers have now streamed their videos twice for the world to see.185 Hours 
after the October 9, 2019 attack in Germany, initial investigations found there was 
a coordinated effort on messaging services to share the video of the attack 
online.186 These coordinated attempts to aid the shooter in spreading the shooter’s 
message crosses the First Amendment threshold of speech and turns into action, 
sustaining an aiding and abetting charge.187 Section A presents arguments in 
support of finding sharers liable under accomplice liability.188 Section B outlines 
the restraints that American First Amendment jurisprudence places on courts’ 
ability to hold sharers liable for their speech.189 Section C presents an illustration 
of how sharing a video could amount to accomplice liability.190 
A. Why Should the United States Punish Republication? 
Within United States criminal law, some laws punish criminal actions because 
of the harm they cause, rather than the message they convey.191 For example, 
depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct constitutes “child 
sexual exploitation.”192 In explaining the justification for child pornography laws, 
the DOJ describes the irreparable harm the production of such pornography 
causes.193 Further, the DOJ describes how the Internet has exacerbated the 
problem.194 First, child pornography is easily accessible and distributable to those 
seeking to find the content online on various forums.195 Second, the online 
communities seeking sexually exploitive content online find solace in one 
another.196 And third, this community support desensitizes offenders to the harm 
they cause and erodes the shame that usually accompanies this behavior.197 
Congress has also worked to pass laws that make animal cruelty a crime, 
 
185.  See Germany Shooting: 2,200 People Watched on Twitch, supra note 7 (describing the stream in both 
Germany and New Zealand). 
186.  Id. 
187.  See infra Section VI.A. (arguing that accomplice liability is an appropriate offense to charge the sharer 
of a video with). 
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191.  Volokh, supra note 172, at 1409–12 (noting areas of the law that look to the harms caused by the acts, 
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192.  Child Pornography, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/child-pornography (last 
visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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focusing specifically on animal crush videos.198 In 2010, Congress passed a law 
that attempted “to criminalize the commercial creation, sale, or possession of 
certain depictions of animal cruelty.”199 Later, the Court in United States v. Stevens 
declared the law as overly broad as written.200 However, Justice Samuel Alito’s 
dissenting opinion signaled what he believed to be the challenged law’s purpose.201 
He stated that the law was “enacted not to suppress speech, but to prevent horrific 
acts of animal cruelty . . . [and the videos are] a form of depraved entertainment 
that has no social value.”202 Further, Justice Alito suggested that someone 
recording the act is “likely to be criminally culpable, either as aiders and abettors 
or conspirators.”203 
In response to the desire for an animal cruelty law, Congress recently passed 
the Preventing Animal Cruelty Act (“PACT”).204 Under PACT, the act of animal 
crushing is now illegal.205 PACT received widespread support on the online 
petition platform Change.org, where nearly 800,000 people signed the petition in 
support of the bill.206 PACT is not concerned with the motivation behind the 
abuser.207 Rather, PACT works to hold those abusing animals liable when the 
“abuse is intentional and unjustified.”208 
The United States has considered the negative and undesirable results of child 
pornography and animal cruelty and made the decision to make such conduct 
illegal.209 In comparing the content of animal cruelty (i.e., depicting the harming 
and killing of animals) to depictions of humans killed in a mass shooting, it is likely 
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2019, 11:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/25/782842651/trump-signs-law-making-cruelty-to-animals-a-
federal-crime (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (West 2019) 
(providing the recently enacted law for animal crush videos); see also What is “Animal Crushing?”, 
COEXISTENCE ANIMAL RTS. ON EARTH (Dec. 30, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://careanimalrights.org/2016/12/what-is-
animal-crushing/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining animal crushing as “the brutal 
act of torturing animals . . . [v]ideos often feature women in high heels stepping on small animals and crushing 
them”). 
199.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010) (emphasis added). 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. at 482 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. at 494. 
204.  Gonzales, supra note 198. 
205.  Bill Chappell, Animal Cruelty as a Federal Crime: Trump Is Expected to Sign Bill Passed by 
Congress, NPR (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/777280602/trump-is-expected-to-sign-bill-
making-animal-cruelty-a-federal-crime (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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that a law regulating the footage of humans being killed would have support.210 
Following the reasoning in Justice Alito’s dissent in Stevens, he stated that “[i]t is 
undisputed that the conduct depicted in crush videos may constitutionally be 
prohibited.”211 The same logic applies to shooting videos where, undoubtedly, the 
United States Constitution prohibits the conduct of murdering people.212 
The law does not regulate depictions of animal cruelty and child pornography 
because of the speech, but rather the underlying harm those acts cause.213 The 
extension of liability from the shooter to the sharer of the video under a theory of 
accomplice liability advances similar policies.214 
In a recent case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of 
liability on a young woman who encouraged her boyfriend to take his own life.215 
The woman was not physically present at the time the teen committed suicide, but 
sent dozens of messages encouraging her boyfriend to go through with the act.216 
The defense argued the woman did not commit an affirmative, physical act 
contributing to the death.217 The Massachusetts Supreme Court ignored the 
argument that the girlfriend’s presence—only remote—was insufficient to sustain 
the charge.218 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari regarding the 
young woman’s appeal, despite the argument that the decision violated her First 
Amendment rights.219 She received a fifteen-month prison sentence.220 This 
Massachusetts case exemplifies an instance where the speech of an actor amounts 
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https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2020/01/13/supreme-court-michelle-carter/ (on file with the University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
216.  All the Texts Between Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy the Day He Died, BOS. 25 NEWS (July 9, 
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they-day-he-died/532942907/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
217.  Carla Zavala, Comment, Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide Manslaughter?, 47 SETON 
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https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/13/politics/supreme-court-michelle-carter-boyfriend-suicide/index.html (on file 
with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 570 (presenting the analysis ruling that 
Carter did not have a viable First Amendment claim to rebut the charge of involuntary manslaughter). 
220.  De Vogue, supra note 219. 
University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52 
953 
to conduct because the text messages she sent were both “objectively and 
subjectively reckless,” sustaining the involuntary manslaughter conviction.221 The 
outcome in the Massachusetts case follows a recent trend of charging those who 
encourage suicide with manslaughter.222 It is not the words that are said that justify 
the imposition of liability, but rather the harm that is the result of conduct—i.e., 
the end of another person’s life.223 
Online, the rejection of traditional social norms occurs as speakers feel 
heightened protection both from distance and the shield of a screen, where they are 
unlikely to face repercussions for their actions.224 To some, technology may 
present the perfect platform to commit a crime and conduct themselves in a manner 
in which they would not carry themselves in face-to-face interactions.225 
Furthermore, legislation and Supreme Court decisions are unlikely to address hate 
speech produced on the Internet in part because the Internet operates outside of a 
single jurisdiction.226 However, the holding in Matal v. Tam remains controlling 
precedent, leaving hate speech a protected form of expression in the United 
States.227 Matal’s holding, however, does not protect crimes that hate motivates.228 
But even the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) makes clear on its webpage 
that “[h]ate itself is not a crime—and the FBI is mindful of protecting freedom of 
speech.”229 
Policing the presence of violent content on the Internet raises multiple 
problems.230 First, the Internet presents jurisdictional issues.231 Questions continue 
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to exist regarding what may establish jurisdiction for crimes committed online.232 
Speech disseminated on the Internet can instantaneously extend beyond 
jurisdictional boundaries.233 Second, the Internet supports the deterioration of 
societal norms.234 In both the context of hate speech and child pornography, there 
is a growing acceptance of views and speech that society has historically 
shamed.235 
With the advent of the Internet, hate speech spreads more readily and leaves 
lasting impacts.236 Minority groups in the United States have reported a rise in both 
hate speech on the Internet and hate crimes.237 The way individuals propagate hate 
speech online is different than spoken hate speech.238 When someone says 
something hateful aloud, it does not remain in a published online world; it goes 
away.239 The reality of online speech is that words, thoughts, and ideas online are 
more permanent.240 They are a reminder of the hate that exists towards certain 
groups or individuals.241 
Following mass shootings in El Paso, Texas, and Dayton, Ohio, The 
Washington Post called for the incitement framework to apply and for enforcement 
of online speech to occur.242 However, when a court categorizes speech as inciteful, 
what is the appropriate punishment for the speaker?243 The Washington Post author 
correctly notes that it would require the courts to draw lines at what is imminent 
and when speech becomes likely to incite imminent lawless action.244 However, 
the author underestimates the intra-jurisdictional problems that speech presents 
and the additional issues stemming from punishing speech for the sake of obtaining 
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judicial line-drawing.245 
Holding sharers liable under a theory of aiding and abetting would not impose 
liability on someone who shares a video for the sake of reporting on an event.246 
Rather, by holding the sharer liable for his active role in helping a shooter share 
his message, the derivative liability comes from the principal by the sharer’s goal 
to aid the principal.247 
The reality is that the Internet provides a different type of forum—raising a 
multitude of issues that our Founding Fathers could not have predicted.248 The 
speed of dissemination of information on the Internet and the ability to protect 
anonymity makes the Internet a breeding ground for content that society has oft 
rejected.249 Looking at the conduct of the sharer not as one who speaks but as one 
who helps in the principal’s terror campaign addresses the limits of the Internet.250 
B. Overinclusive First Amendment Jurisprudence? 
As discussed above, the First Amendment offers broad protections to speakers, 
even when their speech is unpopular.251 The First Amendment protects publication 
of crimes that are likely to later attract a “copycat” who will attempt or carry out a 
similar crime in a similar way.252 This protection exists despite the inherent dangers 
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of copycats, illustrating the strength of the First Amendment.253 The incitement 
framework as illustrated in Brandenburg is too narrow to extend to the 
republication of shooter videos on the Internet as inciting imminent lawless 
action.254 The requirement for imminence under Brandenburg is too far removed 
from the online sharing of videos.255 
In practice, the requirements set out in Brandenburg are difficult to apply.256 
Courts must evaluate whether harm is likely, which is difficult even from the 
Internet.257 The rate at which content spreads online and the masses of people who 
instantaneously have access to postings presents a greater question for courts to 
determine: at which point does the likelihood of harm cross the threshold of 
incitement?258 Further, the imminence requirement of Brandenburg poses another 
question: is it imminent from the time of posting or from the time the reader reads 
it?259 The Court has not addressed the temporal nature of the imminence 
requirement, but there is a suggestion that speech would need to show “at least 
some . . . temporal imminence.”260 If the imminence requirement includes acts that 
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follow speech closely in time, how can courts properly apply the imminence 
standard when posts on the Internet remain online indefinitely?261 If the online 
postings amount to hate speech, the First Amendment jurisprudence protects that 
speech as well.262 
Any laws drafted to criminalize the glorification of terror, as other countries 
have done, would require extreme drafting precision.263 Such laws would be 
content-based, requiring them to survive strict scrutiny.264 Glorification laws, 
under First Amendment jurisprudence, also run the risk of being overly broad.265 
Furthermore, laws punishing glorification would likely cause a chilling effect 
on speech.266 Such a chilling effect was at the center of concerns leading up to the 
passage of the United Kingdom’s 2006 Terrorism Act.267 Where glorification laws 
exist, they run the risk of criminalizing speech that is political in nature, such as 
when there is support for groups trying to overturn political systems.268 There is 
value in protecting speech that is unpopular or that represents a minority 
viewpoint.269 In fact, Brandenburg’s incitement test partly exists to provide 
protection to political speech—protecting minority political views and criticism of 
the government.270 
The COVID-19 outbreak is an illustrative example of the dangers of silencing 
minority opinions.271 At the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in China, 
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Chinese officials silenced a medical doctor when the doctor began to report on the 
suspected outbreak.272 For the first four weeks of the outbreak, Chinese officials 
attempted to minimize how severe the disease was.273 Even in the wake of 
widespread anger following the death of the doctor, China has remained steadfast 
in silencing speech that criticizes its handling of the virus.274 Officials suspended 
accounts on WeChat, an application with many users in China, that discussed the 
outbreak and that potentially communicated criticisms of the government’s 
handling of the outbreak.275 It is possible that the delayed reaction of Chinese 
officials to mitigate the spread at the start of the outbreak made the extent of the 
virus worse.276 The Chinese Government’s reaction to suppress the speech 
underscores and exemplifies the real-world consequences of suppressing 
speech.277 
In short, absent a Supreme Court ruling that glorification of terror is a specific 
area of speech that no longer has First Amendment protection, glorification laws 
are likely incompatible with current First Amendment jurisprudence.278 There also 
remains a question—even if First Amendment jurisprudence changed—with the 
potential dangers inherent in glorification laws.279 While the spread of terror online 
is undoubtedly dangerous, there is a concern that glorification laws would “limit 
or silence legitimate reporting or criticism.”280 Broadly drafted glorification laws 
run the risk of penalizing media outlets that provide valuable information to the 
public about current events.281 
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about the Coronavirus and the presence of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns about the global pandemic). 
278.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (noting the need for a history of 
proscription to recognize a category of speech as unworthy of First Amendment protections). 
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C. How Sharing a Video Facilitates the Crime of the Attacker 
The United States Code defines acts of terror as “violent acts or acts dangerous 
to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States” with 
the intent to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population.”282 Tarrant’s deadly 
actions, which he targeted at the Muslim community, paired with his online 
manifesto would unquestionably intimidate the Muslim population.283 Further, 
Tarrant’s desire to extend his carnage beyond the four walls of the mosque 
continued his act of terror onto the Internet.284 
At its core, the basis for extending liability to those who aid and abet a 
principal actor requires the accomplice’s engagement in an “intentional action 
designed to persuade or help.”285 Further justification for extending liability in this 
circumstance stems from the idea that “knowledge that aid will be given can 
influence the principal’s decision to go forward.”286 In response to a call to action, 
such as Tarrant’s call to “spread his message,” a sharer intentionally engages in an 
action desired by the principal actor.287 Further, when sharers act to manipulate a 
video, as exhibited in New Zealand, they no longer are passively sharing a video.288 
The extra step of manipulating a video to overcome blocks on social media is 
evidence that the sharer took an active role in becoming a part of the mass terror 
campaign, continuing to intimidate and terrorize the subjects of the principal’s 
hatred.289 
In instances like the New Zealand shooting, it appears the principal actor takes 
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Nev. Jan. 6, 2015) (describing the nature of an intentional act within the context of posting messages online); 
Macklin, supra note 13, at 19 (detailing Tarrant’s requests online for others to share his messages that he had 
posted on both Facebook and 8chan). 
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purpose”), with Share, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/share (last visited 
June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining share as “to distribute on the 
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289.  Compare Macklin, supra note 13, at 18 (describing the request made by Tarrant to continue to spread 
his message online), with New Zealander Jailed, supra note 6 (describing the actions that Arps took to continue 
to spread the video online, including the manipulation of the footage to include crosshairs and a kill count). 
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actions to ensure the dissemination of the attack online.290 Tarrant posted on 8chan 
about ten to twenty minutes before the attack.291 Tarrant directed others on the 
forum when he requested readers to “please do your part spreading my 
message.”292 When the sharer Arps manipulated and shared the video, following 
Tarrant’s explicit request to spread his message, Arps deliberately helped Tarrant 
spread his violence online.293 Arps effectively showed purpose to aid in Tarrant’s 
offense, meeting the threshold for accomplice liability under the MPC.294 Tarrant 
desired the continuing republication of his attack online in case he would be unable 
to do so himself.295 When Arps and other actors stepped in to help keep the video 
online, they aided Tarrant in his offense of continuing his terror and intimidation 
by reproducing footage of the live killings.296 
In looking at a common thread among manifestos, there often exists either a 
desire to create a legacy in the name of a cause or reference to someone who 
previously carried out an attack.297 The almost assured promise for notoriety acts 
as a motivating factor for the shooter to continue on with his plans.298 For example, 
Tarrant’s manifesto cited inspiration to Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian man 
convicted of a bombing in Oslo and a mass shooting at a summer camp for 
children.299 Following Tarrant’s attack, a twenty-one-year-old Norwegian man 
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for after the attack and hired a company to “cleanse the online profiles of him after the mass shooting, so that his 
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University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52 
961 
attempted to carry out an attack on a mosque, referred to Tarrant as “Saint Tarrant,” 
and claimed that Tarrant chose him to carry out his own act.300 History shows a 
repeated pattern of reading, posting, and then acting upon manifestos and the 
extremist ideals underlying their texts.301 Republishing and disseminating videos 
on behalf of principal attackers who cannot spread their message themselves helps 
to provide the notoriety that many attackers desire.302 Support from online 
communities and the almost assured promise of widespread media coverage work 
to maintain the underlying motivating factor to obtain notoriety for their actions.303 
The promise of the escape in a getaway car after committing a crime motivates the 
principal actor to carry out their initial act.304 In the scenario of a mass shooting, 
the promise of a legacy can provide the shooter with the final push to commit their 
act of terror.305 It is this assistance and encouragement that justifies linking the 
actions of the principal attacker with the sharer.306 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Without a change in First Amendment jurisprudence, it is unlikely that either 
federal or state legislatures could enact laws penalizing the glorification of 
terror.307 The Internet has created a reality where communication online is more 
readily available, easier to use, and less expensive than ever before.308 
“Gatekeepers” that previously existed in society are not present online to keep 
potentially dangerous speech at bay, and those who wish to communicate 
dangerous messages are better able to find like-minded individuals who share 
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similar dangerous thoughts.309 
When a “sharer” goes out of their way to communicate the message of the 
shooter, the sharer acts with a purpose to continue the original shooter’s campaign 
of terror.310 Underlying policy in support of criminalizing actions that result in 
harm to animals and children would likely support some sort of restraint on 
depictions of terror.311 But, as discussed above, it is unlikely that a broad law 
penalizing the glorification of terror would successfully withstand a First 
Amendment challenge.312 A theory of accomplice liability—where the sharer has 
the purpose of promoting and expanding on an act of terror—finds support in the 
policy of depriving shooters from what they want: notoriety.313 
In the United States, the doctrine of accomplice liability extends to a wide 
range of cases.314 Our laws have dictated that liability is not extended to just 
anyone, but only to someone who aids or encourages in the commission of a 
crime.315 We allow this extension of liability to an accomplice because of an 
underlying desire for justice, finding that “one who willingly participates or aids 
in the commission of a crime deserves punishment.”316 
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